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WHAT EUTHYPHRO COULDN'T HAVE SAID 
James G. Hanink and Gary R. Mar 
In this paper we argue for a simple version of Divine Command Morality, namely that 
an act's being morally right consists in its being in accord with God's will, and an act's 
being morally wrong consists in its being contrary to God's will. In so arguing, we 
contend that this simple version of Divine Command Morality is not subject to the 
Euthyphro dilemma, either as Plato or as contemporary critics have ordinarily proposed 
it. Nor, we maintain, is our position incompatible with the most adequate formulation of 
natural law ethics. Finally we explain why Euthyphro could not have made a better case 
for his own position. 
Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher 
of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For 
since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know 
him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to 
save those who believe.' 
What is it to be a "simple believer?" In part, it is to see in God's will the standard 
of what is morally right and morally wrong. 2 This ethical stance doubtless con-
tributes to the annoyed dismissal simple believers often receive in both public 
and philosophical forums. How important philosophy has been in bringing about 
the marginal status of the simple believer and his ethical stance is hard to say. 3 
If conceptual analysis counts as much as philosophers like to think, then the role 
of philosophy has been a major one. certainly there are grounds for the general 
claim that the teaching of philosophy is seldom kind to the thesis that God's 
will is the standard of what is right and wrong. This ethical stance, usually 
termed Divine Command morality (hereafter, DCM), has been given rough 
handling from Plato to Frankena, with any number of hostile critics in between. 
Although contemporary defenses of DCM have appeared in philosophical journals 
and colloquia, these defenses have employed sophisticated metaethical, causal, 
or 'paradigmatic' versions of DCM that the simple believer might well fail to 
recognize.' Our first question, then, is whether there is a philosophically defen-
sible version of DCM that a simple believer could both recognize and embrace. 
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The generally negative assessment of DCM from Plato's time to our own is 
largely due to Socrates' famous challenge to Euthyphro. This challenge, known 
as the Euthyphro dilemma, is perhaps the most serious and sophisticated challenge 
to the coherence of any DCM. 
Let us begin, appropriately, with a simple version of DCM.5 
(V. 1) An act's being morally right consists in its being in accord with 
God's will, and an act's being morally wrong consists in its being 
contrary to God's will. 
Admittedly, the use of 'consists' in (V.I) is vague, and we will say more about 
this in subsequent sections. But our present concern is to formulate the Euthyphro 
dilemma for (V. 1). 
Euthyphro's original version of DCM, namely, 
(V.2) An act is holy if all the gods love it, and an act is unholy if all 
the gods hate it, 
differs in three conspicuous ways from (V. 1). First, Euthyphro's (V.2) is stated 
with respect to the gods of Homer, whereas the cornerstone of the simple 
believer's (V.I) is the God of Judaism and Christianity. This sharp transition 
from Hellenism to Hebraism will be essential to our defense of DCM. Secondly, 
following the tenor of modem philosophy, (V. 1) is stated in terms of 'right' and 
'wrong' rather than in terms of 'holy' and 'unholy.' Finally, Euthyphro's (V.2), 
unlike (V.l), is compatible with a merely extensional equivalence between God's 
willing or forbidding an act and that act's being right or wrong. And, of course, 
Socrates devises his dilemma to underscore just this point. 
According to received philosophical doctrine, none of the above modifications 
in the transition from (V. 2) to (V. 1) succeeds in dulling the pointedness of the 
Euthyphro dilemma. Thus, most philosophers conclude that the dilemma, as 
directed against the simple believer's (V.I), shows morality'S conceptual inde-
pendence from the God. And many, like Socrates, following only the authority 
of argument, see in this dilemma a dialectical weapon against any hint of "au-
thoritarianism" in ethics. 6 But lest we acquiesce in any hasty conclusions, let us 
examine the supposed cogency of the Euthyphro dilemma-as directed against 
(V.l). 
We can state the dilemma as follows: 
(PI) Either an act is right because God wills it, or God wills an act 
because it is right. 
IP2) If an act is right because God wills it, then morality is arbitrary. 
WHAT EUTHYPHRO COULDN'T HAVE SAID 
(P3) If God wills an act because it is right, then DCM if false. 
(P4) Therefore, either morality is arbitrary or DCM is false. 
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We might best appreciate the force of this dilemma if we next elaborate the 
supporting arguments for (P2) and (P3). 
(P2), which expresses the first hom of the Euthyphro dilemma, is the claim 
that DCM makes right and wrong arbitrary. For suppose that an act is right or 
wrong just because God wills or forbids it. If so, then it seems that there is 
nothing intrinsic to the act itself that makes it right or wrong. Instead, whether 
it is right or wrong depends on a single decisive, but extrinsic, factor: God's 
will. Worse still for the simple believer, if God were now to forbid what had 
hitherto been a right act and to will what had hitherto been a wrong act, then 
right becomes wrong and wrong becomes right. Even if what God approves of 
is-as a matter of fact-what is right and what God disapproves of is-as a 
matter of fact-what is wrong, it seems that God's will could not, without flirting 
with arbitrariness, be the standard of morality. 
So staunch an apologist as C. S. Lewis, writing about DCM, voices this very 
worry. 
There were in the eighteenth century terrible theologians who held that 
'God did not command certain things because they are right, but certain 
things are right because God commanded them.' To make the position 
perfectly clear, one of them even said that though God has, as it happens, 
commanded us to love Him and one another, He might equally well 
have commanded us to hate Him and one another, and hatred would 
then have been right. It was apparently a mere toss-up which he decided 
to do. Such a view in effect makes God a mere arbitrary tyrant. It would 
be better and less irreligious to believe in no God and to have no ethics 
than to have such an ethics and such a theology as this.7 
Does the faith of the simple believer that the heart of morality is to be found in 
God's will indeed implicate God in a scheme of moral arbitrariness? 
The simple believer, of course, will want to block the accusation of arbitrar-
iness. But how? The Commandments, he insists, are not merely arbitrary rules, 
enjoined upon even the non-believer. Rather the Commandments are, as it were, 
fundamental directives that tell us how we might respect and fulfill the nature 
that our Creator has given us. 8 
But if this answer is made, then further conceptual problems arise. For isn't 
the simple believer holding that: (a) an act is right because God wills it, and (b) 
God wills the act because it contributes to human flourishing? Yet it follows 
from (a) and (b), the critic charges, that an act is right, ultimately, because of 
its relation to human flourishing. If so, then haven't we have arrived at some 
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form of naturalism? But, if this is the case, why not avoid the detour through 
DCM and its attendant conundrums? 
We have seen something, then, of the force of the first hom of the Euthyphro 
dilemma. The second hom, to which we now tum, will seem just as daunting. 
If DeM's account of right and wrong is not to be viciously circular, then it 
would seem that if God wills an act because it is right, the rightness of the act 
could not consist in God's willing it. The critic argues that 'because,' when used 
univocally, is an antisymmetric relation. Thus, for any propositions p and q, 
(l) if p because q, then it is not the case that q because p. 
Now, the critic claims, we can see why (P3), the second hom of the dilemma, 
is true. For suppose we admit the antecedent of (P3), namely, that 
(P3.a) God wills an act because it is right. 
Using the minimal assumption that 'consists' implies 'because,' namely that 
(V.1. a) an act's being morally right consists in being in accord with 
God's will 
at least implies that 
(2) an act is right because God wills it, 
we can apply (1), the principle of the antisymmetry of 'because,' to (P3.a) to 
infer the negation of (2) and so conclude that DCM, as expressed by (V.I.a), 
is false. Thus, if God wills an act because it is right, then it cannot be right 
because God wills it. Hence an act's being right cannot simply consist in God's 
willing it. 
There is, moreover, still another way of arguing for the second hom of the 
Euthyphro dilemma. This added argument rests on the claim that the believer 
must first justify his confidence about what God in fact wills by an appeal to 
ethical norms. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer have put their case plainly 
enough. 
Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with 
such commandments as 'make love to thy neighbor's wife,' 'Steal thy 
neighbor's goods,' and 'Take advantage of thy parents.' We would 
decide that whatever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, 
because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that some-
thing is moral by showing that it expresses God's will, because the only 
available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by 
finding which one is in accordance with what is moral. 9 
If we know that something is God's will because we know that it is right, is it 
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not circular to claim that the act is right because God wills it? 
Traditional philosophical wisdom, then, seems to have shown that the simple 
believer is far too simple. And yet we recall that the foolishness of God is wiser 
than the wisdom of the world. So perhaps we should not just yet dismiss the 
view of the simple believer. 
II 
But what can we say in defense of the simple believer? With his account of 
morality caught on the apparently well-supported horns of the Euthyphro 
dilemma, how are we to proceed? 
Might one try to slip between those horns? Perhaps the alternatives posed in 
the dilemma's first premise 
(PI) Either an act is right because God wills it or God wills it because 
it is right 
are not exhaustive. But how could this be? One way is if the alternatives 'p 
because q' and 'q because p' (where p and q are propositions) are both false 
because p turns out, in some sense, to be equivalent to q. An analogy might be 
useful. Suppose one were asked whether measurement is quantitative because it 
uses numbers or whether measurement uses numbers because it is quantitative. 
Here the alternatives are, of course, spurious because in using numbers for 
measurement, one is engaged in a quantitative activity. Measurement's being 
quantitative just consists in its use of numbers. We cannot take the use of numbers 
in measurement to be the cause or the reason or the explanation of that activity's 
being quantitative, or conversely. 
Now the simple believer reminds us that God personifies Perfect Righteousness. 
Part of what it means to say that God is righteous is that it is God's nature to 
act according to what is right, a righteousness we see in His fulfilling of His 
covenant with His people. To say that God personifies righteousness is to say 
that He is Righteousness. Hence, His acts are righteous simply by being in accord 
with His will. Finally, to say that God is Perfect Righteousness is to say that 
God's righteousness is complete in and of itself. Thus, to say that God personifies 
Perfect Righteousness is to say that his actions are completely and self-sufficiently 
righteous in that they are in accord with His will. God is not righteous because 
God conforms (however perfectly) to some higher standard of righteousness. 
Rather, God's will is not only the measure, but also the personal substance, of 
Perfect Righteousness. Expressing this understanding of God requires, to be 
sure, that the simple believer begin to develop a "philosophy of God." So, to 
an extent, the simple believer now becomes, if not so already, something of a 
philosopher. But this philosophy articulates, rather than supplants, simple belief. 
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Such reflection might well continue with perhaps the most fundamental Judaeo-
Christian insight: God is one. This unity implies, not just that there is only one 
God but also that there is no division within God's nature. The internal divisions 
within our human nature, on the other hand, make possible a kind of chronic 
internal warfare. We often, for example, find our will to be at odds with our 
intellect. But there is no such contest between will and wisdom in God. We 
might, to be sure, find it useful to speak of God on one occasion under the 
aspect of will and on another occasion under the aspect of intellect. But to speak 
of God's will as sovereign does not suggest that God's will could ever by 
exercised arbitrarily. In God will and wisdom are one. 
This doctrine, an aspect of the doctrine of divine simplicity, is often linked 
with the claim that God is identical with His attributes. Alvin Plantinga has 
sharply challenged this related thesis. He complains that while it begins "in a 
pious and proper concern for God's sovereignty, it ends by flouting one of the 
most fundamental claims of theism. "10 Thus, he argues that 
If God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his 
properties is a property, he is a property-a self-exemplifying property. 
Accordingly GOld has just one property: himself. This view is subject 
to a difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No property could have 
created the world; no property could be omniscient, or, indeed know 
anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn't a person but a mere 
abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. 
So taken the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake. 11 
Yet the simple believer, confident that God is both Perfect Righteousness and 
Sovereign Lord, has a response that is a direct as Plantinga's challenge. Confes-
sing that God is both a person and Perfect Righteousness, the simple believer 
concludes that the property of Perfect Righteousness is a person. Of course, 
Perfect Righteousness is not just any person, but rather the Perfect Person. 
Plantinga's assumption that no property is a person is doubtless true when 
restricted to any ordinary nonmoral property. Yet his assumption needs defense 
when it is extended to the extraordinary moral property of Perfect Righteousness. 
The whole preceding line of argument, beginning with the simple believer's 
reminder that God personifies Righteousness, suggests a first escape between 
the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma. With an eye to Plantinga's unconvincing 
objection to its ontological basis, we shall call it the "moral perfection as person" 
stratt:'gy. This strategy, we have seen, insists that God is Perfect Righteousness. 
On this view the charge, that it must be the case that either God wills an act 
because it is right or that an act is right because God wills it, breaks down. 
Neither disjunct is true, since 'because' fails to capture the insight that God 
personifies Righteousness. And the righteousness of one's action just is its sharing 
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in the Perfect Righteousness who is God. The disjunctive first premise, then, of 
the Euthyphro dilemma betrays a deep misconception of the nature of God, and 
so the believer can rightly reject that premise. 
However, the simple believer need not be committed to what we suggest above 
as the preferred ontological thesis about persons and properties. For even if one 
were to hold an absolute bifurcation of persons and properties, there is yet another 
way to deal with the disjunctive premise of the Euthyphro dilemma. The believer 
may take perfect righteousness as an essential attribute of God but nonetheless 
not identical with Him. There is, to be sure, a putative problem with holding 
this view. It takes the form of a new dilemma. If God created perfect righteous-
ness,then there was a state of affairs in which God was not perfectly righteous, 
and so righteousness could not even be an essential property of God. But what 
if God did not create righteousness? Seemingly, the believer is not yet out of 
the woods. For if God did not create righteousness, then either righteousness 
exists independently of God or righteousness is essentially part of God's nature. 
In the former case, God is not sovereign nor is righteousness essential to God's 
nature. In the latter case, God's existence depends on His properties. Thus, here 
too, God's sovereignty is supposedly threatened. 
But again the believer is not without a response. For perhaps God's uncreated 
but essential righteousness is dependent on Him for its existence and identity in 
a way that does not make God's existence equally dependent on His righteousness. 
An analogy with the natural numbers might suggest the kind of relation that we 
have in mind. The number one is a member, indeed an essential member, of 
the system of natural numbers, and distinguishable from the other natural numbers 
by the role it plays in this larger system. Although neither the number one nor 
the natural number system could exist without the other, the system of natural 
numbers is nonetheless a mathematical object of a logically higher order than is 
the number one. In this respect, the logical relation between the number one 
and the system of natural numbers is analogous to the metaphysical relationship 
between righteousness and God. Neither righteousness nor God could exist 
without the other, but God is metaphysically richer than is the attribute of 
righteousness. Once grounded in this metaphysical primacy, the sovereignty of 
God can be upheld. 
We might call the second way of rejecting the disjunctive premise of the 
original Euthyphro dilemma the "property as essential attribute" strategy. While 
we continue to prefer our "moral perfection as person" strategy, we nonetheless 
see no insurmountable problem for the believer who insists on an absolute 
bifurcation between persons and properties or who prefers to say that God 
exemplifies-rather than is-Perfect Righteousness. These positions need not 
jeopardize God's sovereignty. For God's having a nature in the sense of having 
uncreated essential properties is entirely compatible with God's being metaphys-
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ically richer than, and in this sense sovereign over, anyone of these essential 
properties. 
Thus, the simple believer can then adopt either the "moral perfection as person" 
strate'gy or the "property as essential attribute" strategy for denying the truth of 
the first premise of the Euthyphro dilemma. 12 
Let us now tum our attention to (P2) of the Euthyphro dilemma. It expresses 
what we call "the objection from arbitrariness." The objection from arbitrariness 
really has two components. There is, to begin with, the preliminary criticism 
that the believer's ethical stance makes the standard of morality extrinsic to 
human acts. An act is right or wrong not because of the kind of act it is but 
because of God's will with respect to it. The second criticism draws its strength 
from the believer's general commitment to the objectivity of moral rightness and 
wrongness and his specific insistence on God's righteousness. The criticism, 
then, is that DCM reduces morality to the commands issuing from a subjective 
will (albeit God's) and makes God party to an ethical framework that counte-
nances, at least in theory, a deep moral inconstancy. But ethics just could not 
be like that. If morality is objective and if God is righteous and just, then the 
believer must be the first to look for another standard of right and wrong. 
In light of such criticisms, it is no wonder that the simple believer can become 
uneasy about his initial claim that God's will is the fundamental standard of 
right and wrong. But if the believer remains a simple believer, one suspects that 
he will not find in modem philosophy much help in seeing just what is the 
standard of right and wrong. Neither the normative theories of intuitionism nor 
utilitrrianism nor social contract thought, at any rate, seem satisfactory. For the 
believer recognizes that they too often have implications that run counter to what 
God wills. (Even if God's will is not the standard of morality, if remains-any 
believer contends-that actions that God wills are right and those that are contrary 
to His will are wrong.) Perhaps a Kantian approach offers greater promise than 
the general run of secular candidates. Yet Kant seems too often to fall victim 
to hi.; own formalism. For sometimes an innocuous maxim turns out not to be 
universalizable while an immoral but cleverly restricted maxim passes muster. 
Mor{~over, the central Kantian category of respect for persons is left perilously 
unspecified. What, then, is the believer to do? How is he to construct a coherent 
account of his ethics? 
First of all, the believer ought not to give up on the whole of philosophical 
ethics, much less do so without any scouting of its domain. Nor, of course, is 
philosophical ethics exhausted by the traditions just noted. Indeed, elements of 
each of these can be seen as themes interwoven into the fabric of DCM. The 
simple believer reminds us that Scripture speaks of the insights of conscience, 
of the call to an unrestricted benevolence, and of the covenant we share with 
God. But more importantly, the believer should not give up his original insight 
WHAT EUTHYPHRO COULDN'T HAVE SAID 249 
that God's will is the standard of morality. What the believer must surely pursue, 
however, is a deeper grasp of just how God's will is the standard of right and 
wrong. The critic, then, actually does the believer a great service in forcing him 
to articulate this deeper understanding. 
Now the deeper understanding that seems necessary has a tradition of its own. 
It is by no means unfamiliar to believers who have had an opportunity for ethical 
reflection. But its components, when they are accepted at all, are often scattered 
and put at cross purposes by modernity. The structure of this deeper understand-
ing, then is roughly as follows. 
What God wills for human beings is that they be happy. Their happiness 
consists in realizing such basic goods as life, knowledge, family, community, 
play, work, and worship of God. In realizing and participating in such goods, 
human beings flourish. 13 Thus we act rightly when what we do helps us to realize 
and participate in what is humanly good and helps us to do so without intentionally 
destroying or compromising what is humanly good. But, clearly, what is good 
for us depends on the nature that we have. And this nature is not our doing. It 
is God's creation. As such, it is a profound expression of God's creative will. 
Moreover, seeing the goodness of His creation, God specifically wills and indeed 
legislates that we fulfill our nature and in so doing achieve happiness. God's 
will, in this twofold fashion of creative and legislative will, is truly the standard 
of what is right and wrong. I4 Thus, the simple believer can never really forget 
that we are a kind of animal distinguished from others by being made in God's 
image and on this account free and rational. Weare to live our lives on the basis 
of this extraordinary nature. 
Given this sketch of how the believer might better understand the relation 
between God's will and morality, how exactly can we meet "the objection from 
arbitrariness?" What response is to be made to the objection that were God's 
will the standard of morality, the specter of arbitrariness could not be exorcised? 
This "objection from arbitrariness" has, as we have noted, two components. 
There is, first, the preliminary point that DCM makes the standard of morality 
extrinsic to human acts. Can it be that an act is right or wrong not because of 
the kind of act it is but in virtue of how God's will is related to it? 
This first component can, we think, be successfully answered. To begin with, 
it ignores certain special cases in which precisely because one is acting as God's 
agent the very structure and kind of action that one performs is determined by 
God's will. 15 Was, for example, Abraham's decision to sacrifice Isaac an act of 
his simply intending the death of an innocent, and so committing murder, albeit 
for God's glory? If so, it was morally reprehensible. But in fact Abraham's 
decision was, rather, a decision to execute God's will. Were it not, it could not 
be recounted as an act of faith. 16 So it is God's intention that gives Abraham's 
act its special character. And God's intention could scarcely be to secure the 
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death of an innocent person, and so commit murder, for His glory. Why not? 
God, as the creator and master of life, is thereby so related to human life that 
He is logically precluded from being a murderer. (Indeed, it is as peculiar to 
think of God's acts as having some sort of internal means-ends structure as it 
would be to think of God's deliberating, as we might, about how to achieve an 
end.) 
Far more importantly, we can now see that this first component of the objection 
from arbitrariness overlooks the central point that God's will determines the 
nature that we have. What makes the act a human act is that we do it, and we 
act well in doing it if it perfects our nature. Since the nature is itself the result 
of God's creative will, God's legislative will with respect to any particular act 
can hardly be seen as extrinsic to the excellence of that act. For to be extrinsic 
to the excellence of an act means, in this context, to be accidental to the act's 
being excellent. But human acts are excellent just because they fulfill the human 
nature that God has willed. God's will, far from being accidental to human 
excellence, is its creative source. God, moreover, has a single will even if we 
consider it from distinguishable perspectives. That single will constantly 
expresses God's nature. And our deepening participation in God's nature is what 
fulfills our own nature. 
There remains, of course, the second component of "the objection from arbit-
rariness." Once the worry about an extrinsic moral standard is put to rest, there 
is still what one might term the question of variability. For what if God were 
to will the reverse of what He now wills with respect to human acts? In that 
case our morality would be turned inside out. Clearly our previous consideration 
of God's will being one with God's intellect counts against the critic's charge 
of arbitrary variability. (After all, Hamlet was a melancholiac in accord with 
Shakespeare's dramatic intentions, but how odd it would be, even here, to say 
that Hamlet's character depended only on Shakespeare's arbitrary will. In our 
case, of course, we have the nature that we do in accord with God's will; and 
how mistaken it would be to say that our nature has been arbitrarily willed.) 
There is a further consideration about God's will that plays an important role 
in the defense of the simple believer's position. God's will, including His will 
for us, is essential to God, or at least immutable with respect to Him. God's 
nature is unchanging. So to speak of God's first willing one thing for us and 
then willing another-and perhaps inconsistent-thing is metaphysically impos-
sible. To speak in such a way implies that God, who changes not, undergoes 
change within Himself. 17 (If God were subject to change·-at least such a change 
as from good to better--God would fail to be worthy of worship since such 
change would imply some lack within God's nature.) Thus, the hypothesis that 
God might will an act of cruelty makes sense only if the hypothesis that God 
migh1 not be God makes sense. The simple believer, of course, insists that the 
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latter hypothesis makes no sense at all. But if this hypothesis makes no sense, 
then the objection that DCM is somehow arbitrary is a failed objection. DCM 
is no more arbitrary than God is Arbitrary. 
Here, though, the critic might protest that the chief worry raised by the objection 
from arbitrariness is not that God might change His will for us. Rather the worry 
is that God's will for us might have always been different than it in fact is-and 
different in a morally repugnant way. Thus the objection takes this form. "What 
if God had always willed that we practice cruelty and violate innocent life? 
Surely we would not accept the implication of DCM that if God so willed, 
cruelty and the violation of innocent life would be right." 
But here the believer's answer is plain enough. God's creative will has given 
us a nature that cannot be perfected by such acts, nor could God do otherwise 
in light of His nature. So God's legislative will could not mandate such norms. 
Why is this so? God, the simple believer insists, is love. And God is goodness, 
the personification of goodness. But just as God's will is one with God's reason, 
so also is God's will one with the goodness-and the love-that God is. But 
such a will cannot bring into existence a human nature that would be perfected 
precisely in acting in a fashion that made it less like its Creator. God's seeing 
that mankind is "very good" is Genesis's testimony to man's sharing in the being 
of the Creator. But if God's creative will has made us in God's own image, it 
could hardly be contradicted by His legislative will. Hence, the supposition of 
the objector's query-what if God always willed that we practice cruelty and 
violate innocent life?-is again a metaphysically impossible one. Thus, this 
alternative reading of the objection from arbitrariness does not succeed in sus-
taining the original objection. 
Perhaps, to be sure, a critic might now contend that this version of the objection 
from arbitrariness has been met at much too high a price. Have we not, after 
all, forfeited God's freedom? We are free to act wrongly. God, however, is 
not-but if God were, well, then, God could have given us nature "perfectible" 
by, say, acts of cruelty. 
Now if ever the simple believer is wary of letting "the philosophers" do his 
thinking about God, it is when they reconstruct the concept God with the result 
that God is no longer worthy of worship. So the believer is not about to sign 
away God's freedom. For God's freedom, the believer might argue, need not 
rest on the possibility of acting in accord with some imperfection or limitation. 
We are free to do what is wrong because of our moral weakness. But God, 
whose will has no defect, cannot thus be free. Our freedom, in this respect, is 
the freedom of finitude. The absence of such freedom could well be seen as a 
positive mark of the Divine. Nor must we be surprised that God's freedom could 
have a different character than our own: there is like disparity between His 
knowledge and ours, between His love and our participation therein. 18 
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Here we might also add, with a view to the order of grace, that God's being 
love--God's necessarily being God-is not incompatible with our salvation's 
being His free gift. For it was, first, God's free choice to create us with a nature 
that is able to receive His gift of grace. And, second, when we fell from grace, 
God chose how to respond in love. Just how, and how freely, He did this is the 
Good News. 
But there nonetheless remains in the Euthyphro dilemma--even if our reply 
to the "objection from arbitrariness" is so far successful-the counterfactual 
conditional that so disturbed C. S. Lewis: if God were to will cruelty, then 
cruelty would be right. Ought not we to object to the very assertion of this 
conditional? If according to DCM, this conditional isn't false, doesn't that count 
against DCM? 
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between what a theory logically implies 
and what we, in asserting certain of its consequences, conversationally imply. 
A given statement can be a logical consequence of a true theory and thus be 
true. But to assert that statement could, nonetheless, be conversationally inapprop-
riate. For the assertion, without added contextual information, could be badly 
misleading in ordinary discourse. Thus, a letter of recommendation that says 
only that Jones always attended class and has neat handwriting may assert factual 
truths. But the letter conveys much more. The message it conveys is that Jones 
is, at best, a mediocre student. We communicate not only by what we say, but 
by what we could have said but didn't-by what we conversationally imply. 
Now suppose that the simple believer were to make the isolated assertion that 
if God were, say, to will that we hate Him and one another, then to do so would 
be right. Conversationally this assertion implies at least that it is conceivable 
that God really could will hatred. Otherwise, after all, what would its point be? 
So perhaps, C. S. Lewis was properly alert to something important to the sensi-
bility of the simple believer. Even if DCM logically implies the truth (albeit 
vacuously) of the counterfactual, to assert it is conversationally to imply that 
one is ready to entertain that its antecedent is conceivable or that it is even true 
in some possible world. Hence the simple believer rightly refrains from asserting 
this counterfactual, whatever its truth-value, for to do so betrays a radical mis-
conception of God's nature. (Nonetheless, since we hold that the antecedent of 
this peculiar counterfactual is not possibly true, we could accept the counterfac-
tual's truth without being committed to the possibility of its consequent being 
true.) 
Turning now from Lewis's counterfactual worries, let us consider next, the 
critic's argument that the believer's response to (P2) implies a species of ethical 
naturalism. What is the motive behind the critic's new charge? Perhaps the 
following question suggests something of what is going on. Is a vintage of wine 
good, one might ask, because all the wine experts agree that it is or do they 
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agree because the vintage is good? Ordinarily, we would say that their agreement 
is based on their sensitivities to certain good-making features intrinsic to the 
wine itself. So, an individual with reliable wine-tasting sensitivities might bypass 
the consensus of the experts altogether. The critic's charge that the simple believer 
is committed to ethical naturalism is motivated by similar considerations. How so? 
Assuming again that 'consists' implies 'because,' the critic argues that the 
believer is committed to the following two claims: 
(3) An act is right because God wills it. 
(4) God wills an act because it contributes to human flourishing. 
Now the critic argues that (3) and (4) imply 
(5) So, an act is right, ultimately, because it contributes to human 
flourishing. 
So why suppose that the standard of morality is God's will-anymore than we 
would assume that it's the verdict of tasters that is the standard of good wine? 
But clearly the critic's argument is guilty of a fallacy. For his argument assumes 
the transitivity of the 'because' relation. 19 The argument has the following form" 
(3') p because of q. 
(4') q because of r. 
(5') So, p because of r. 
Once put so baldly, we easily see that this argument form is invalid. If Uriah 
is willing to return to battle because David wants him to, and David wants Uriah 
to return to battle because David wants to keep secret his adultery with Bathsheba, 
it surely does not follow that Uriah is willing to return to battle because David 
wants to keep secret his adultery with Bathsheba. We cannot ignore the intensional 
context created by 'because.' In its first occurrence, 'because' creates a context 
for Uriah's reasons; but in its second occurrence it creates a context for David's 
reasons. Yet David's reasons are not necessarily Uriah's reasons. So the inference 
from (3) and (4) to (5) is fallacious given our rendering of its form. When there 
is a shift in intensional context, the transitivity of 'because' may fail. Thus, the 
critic's argument is invalid. 
So we see that when the simple believer asserts both (3) and (4), there may 
be two separate intensional contexts. 'Because' in (3) creates a context in which 
we find expressed the metaphysical truth that the rightness of an act consists in 
God's willing it. 'Because' in (4) creates a context in which the believer expresses 
a truth that following God leads to flourishing. 
What is more interesting, though, than the critic's logical fallacy is his faulty 
presumption that DCM is incompatible with any ethical naturalism. For in fact 
a rapprochement between DCM and a rich current of natural law ethics is precisely 
254 Faith and Philosophy 
what we seek. One must be careful here, to be sure, not to suppose that just 
any form of OCM can be joined with just any form of natural law ethics. 20 
Certainly, too, some versions of OCM, lacking adequate articulation of either 
God's nature or man's created nature, are unsatisfactory in their own right. 
Equally, some versions of natural law theory, agnostic about the genesis of 
human nature and radically defective about the goods that perfect it, are unsatis-
factor) in their own right. Nonetheless, the best expression of OCM and the 
best expression of natural law ethics do, we think, form a structural unity. 
Why is this so? Both traditions, it turns out, emphasize different dimensions 
of a single process. The process has as its point of inception God's will. This 
will is a creative will and generates a human nature which depends on God for 
its very being. Indeed, in some way it shares in God's own nature. But in willing 
human nature, God also wills the realization of human nature. Moreover, in the 
Decalogue-to take the central case-God' s will operates legislatively. This 
realization of human nature is worked out in the conducting of human life. One's 
life is excellent insofar as one is rightly oriented toward the goods that constitute 
human happiness. One is virtuous insofar as one's conduct is habituated in 
obedience to God's legislative will. Now OCM has emphasized the beginning 
of this process: God's will and the doing of God's will by His human creatures. 
The natural law thinker, on the other hand, has usually underscored the identifi-
cation and the l;ght pursuit of the goods that constitutes human flourishing. Is 
so very much needed, really, for a rapprochement ofthe two traditions? Believers 
who think in terms of OCM need to reflect on how God's creative will is 
expressed through the constitution of human nature and on how that nature is 
fulfilkd in the realization of certain basic goods. Believers who think in terms 
of natural law ethics need to reflect on how the fulfillment of human nature is 
normative precisely because God's will is expressed through that nature and 
virtuous because it is formed in the discipline of obedience to God's will. 
No doubt this rapprochement must face objections from certain partisans of 
the two traditions it aims to unite. Some brand or other of voluntarism might 
insist that human nature has been entirely spoiled by original sin. If this is so, 
then seeing God's will as being expressed through that nature is a futile business. 
The short response to this is simply that were human nature so lamentably 
corrupted as suggested, it is hard to see how salvation could be effected at all. 
For it is we human beings who must be saved, and we cannot be completely 
divorced from our nature. 
Alternatively some Thomists, say, might contend that on the account of mor-
ality that has been developed here, human nature remains the proximate standard 
of the rightness or wrongness of an action. And if this is so, why should we 
articulate the ethical stance of the simple believer in terms of OCM? The answer 
to thi~ question does not deny that our nature, vastly more comprehensible to 
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us than God's nature, is the proximate norm of morality. But what makes human 
nature morally significant is that it is an expression of God's creative will. Thus, 
though not the proximate standard, God's will is the fundamental-and so most 
philosophically interesting-standard of morality. 
Moreover, we want to articulate the ethical stance of the simple believer in 
terms of DCM because we think it can provide a particularly satisfying account 
of the distinctively Christian virtues. Consider, for example, the peculiarly Chris-
tian virtue of humility, which is, in an important sense, central to all the moral 
virtues. From a limited natural law perspective, humility has this pivotal position 
because it guards against the immoderate, and so less than fully rational, pursuit 
of the goods. As such, a lack of humility is an offence against practical reason. 
But from the perspective of DCM, we are better able to see how humility has 
this central role precisely because DCM recognizes our constant dependence on 
God's sovereign legislative and creative will. Correspondingly, pride, the root 
of wrongdoing, is primarily an offence against God, secondarily an offence 
against reason. 
So much, then, for consideration of (P2) of the Euthyphro dilemma. Our 
response has taken us far afield, perhaps, but the results have been considerable. 
We want, next, to reconsider (P3). It states, we recall, that if God approves of 
an act because it is right, then DCM is false. First, notice that one argument for 
(P3) might rest on the assumption that 'consists' implies 'because,' more fully 
that 'an act's being right consists in God's willing it' implies 'the act is right 
because God wills it.' Implicit in our rejection of the disjunctive first premise, 
(PI), of the Euthyphro dilemma is a criticism of this very assumption. Recall 
that measuring's being quantitative just consists in its use of numbers and so, 
accordingly, it is not quantitative because it uses numbers-nor is the converse 
the case. Similarly, DCM need not imply that an act is right because God 
approves of it. But this initial argument for (P3) breaks down precisely in that 
it mistakenly assumes just such an implication. That argument, with its assump-
tions laid bare, is as follows. 
(6) God wills an act because it is right. 
[assumption] 
(7) It is not the case that an act is right because God wills it. 
[from 6 and the antisymmetry of 'because'] 
(8) DCM implies an act is right because God wills it. 
[from the critic's assumption 'consists' implies 'because'] 
(9) So, DCM is false. [from 7 and 8] 
But this argument cannot succeed without (8). 
Notice, furthermore, that the critic's argument also employs the principle of 
the antisymmetry of the 'because' relation. As we pointed out in discussing the 
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non-transitivity of the 'because' relation, a fallacy may also be committed here 
if attention is not paid to shifting intensional contexts. 
But, a critic might continue, isn't there a simpler, and indeed successful, 
argument for (P3)? It runs as follows: 
(6') God wills an act because it is right. 
[assumption] 
(8') DCM implies that it is not the case that God wills an act because 
it is right. [from our assumption that 'p consists in q' implies 'not (q 
because p)'] 
(9') So, DCM is false. [from 6' and 8'] 
To be sure, this is a simple argument, but the supporter of DCM would have 
an equally simple response to it. The critic's argument is merely the conditional 
proof of the contraposition of (8'). Rather than reading this argument as a 
refutalion of DCM, what prevents our construing it as a refutation of the assump-
tion (6')? After all, in meeting this subsidiary argument, the believer in DCM 
need 1Iot accept its assumption. 
In any case, it would still be open to the supporter of DCM to accept the 
conditional proof from (6') to (9'), and even admit that (P3) is true, while still 
rejecting the Euthyphro dilemma in light of our earlier criticisms of (PI) and 
(P2) of that dilemma. 
Here, too, perhaps we can put to rest Cornman and Lehrer's argument for the 
second hom of the Euthyphro dilemma. Recall their objection that if the only 
way to justify that God wills x is to show that x is morally right, then it is not 
the case that x is morally right because God wills it. Does their claim entail that 
DCM is false? By no means-and the argument against DCM to which it gives 
rise is invalid because it confuses epistemological with metaphysical issues. The 
nub oj' Cornman and Lehrer's argument is as follows: 
(10) The only way to justify that p is to show that q. 
(11) So, it is not the case that: q because p 
But consider the following simple counterexample: 
(l 0') The only way to justify that Adam has a soul is to show that Adam 
is rational (or potentially so). 
(11') So, it not the case that: Adam is rational (or potentially so) because 
he has a soul. 
This counterexample shows the invalidity of the critic's original argument. 
We have argued, in section II, that the Euthyphro dilemma, as directed against 
our DeM, does not stand on its logical merits. Why, then, is it often thought 
so compelling? Why is it that objections to DCM sometimes feel decisive when 
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in fact they are not impressive---especially when separated from their cultural 
milieu? 
At least since the Enlightenment, God's nature has been seen through a mirror 
and darkly indeed. The God of public discourse, one might say, has been either 
a vengeful God, or a romantic God of sentimentality, or the detached Watchmaker 
of the deists. But if a culture primarily sees God in any of these diminishing 
categories, it loses its sense of God as steadfast love, perfect righteousness, and 
everlasting Father. Yet when our understanding of God is so diminished, the 
worry that such a God might act arbitrarily becomes very real. Doubtless the 
simple believer should not expect that such a God, if yet alive, will soon recover 
from these cultural impoverishments. Still, the believer should be able to recog-
nize how a defective culture gives a plausibility to, say, the objection from 
arbitrariness that it cannot, when faced with the testimony of the Living God, 
sustain. 
There is, too, an entrenched agnosticism about the possibility of knowing 
God's will in the arena of public policy. A critic motivated by such agnosticism 
might concede that God wills that we love one another or that God wills that 
we pursue justice. But how, the critic asks, is love to be shown and justice 
pursued? How are we actually to procede in the arena of public policy? Indeed, 
the critic suggests, if anyone comes before us with anything but the vaguest 
orientation for public policy worked out in terms of God's will or law, must we 
not suppose him to be a fanatic or a charlatan or, at best, a "fundamentalist?" 
(This last category has a way of becoming in public discourse marvelously 
expansive, either as a term of disparagement or boast.) 
The simple believer shares some of these worries. For the believer, like any 
other citizen of our century, is no stranger to fanatics and charlatans. We know 
that fanatics and charlatans can distort any good and twist any truth. Why suppose 
one's understanding of God's will to be immune? Yet the simple believer has 
no trouble in distinguishing between, say, the religious fanatic's desire to abrogate 
civil liberties to promote a private revelation and, by way of contrast, a basic 
scriptural teaching such as the injunction against shedding the blood of the 
innocent. Nor does the simple believer profess either always to know God's will 
or to suppose that on every occasion there is but a single way of acting on God's 
will. Yet the simple believer finds in Scripture or in the tradition of the Church 
much more than general exhortation. If we love God, we are to keep his command-
ments. 21 These commandments could scarcely challenge us as they do had they 
so little specific content as some suppose. Nor could they, given their challenge, 
strike us as so wise if they did not also comport with our nature in a way that 
the schemes of fanatics and charlatans never can. 
If, of course, one is merely a philosophical theist, then one does not recognize 
Scripture or tradition as revelatory of God's will. Admittedly for such a theist, 
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there is a far greater problem in seeing clearly the content of God's will. Oespite 
this, the simple believer recalls the promise, given in both Testaments, that 
God's law is written in the heart of every believer. 
I will put my law in their minds 
and write it on their hearts 
I will be their God, 
and they will be my people. 
No longer will a man teach his neighbor, 
or a man his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' 
because they will all know me, 
from the least of them to the greatest. 22 
The simple believer's problem is not that of being clear about what are the main 
lines of God's will for him. The real problem is remaining obedient to God's will. 
III 
We have defended the simple believer's OCM against the Euthyphro dilemma. 
Now we might ask why the merits of the simple believer's OCM, and its unique 
metaphysical foundation, have remained so problematic to "the wise." 
Let us begin with two intriguing questions. First, how is it that the Euthyphro 
dilemma succeeds against Euthyphro but fails against our version, (V.I), of 
OCM? And, second, what is it that the simple believer can say that Euthyphro 
couldn't? 
Recall that Euthyphro's OCM was formulated in terms of holiness and the 
gods of Homer. Thus we have: 
(V.2) An act is holy if all the gods love it, and an act is unholy if all 
the gods hate it. 
The gods of Olympus, as we find them in Greek mythology, show all the follies 
of the humanity in the image of which they were crafted. With such gods it is 
no surprise that Plato, a mathematician by temperament, should postulate the 
existence of eternal and perfect universal standards by which the gods, too, could 
be judged. Instead of Zeus, Plato spoke about Justice itself; instead of Athena, 
Wisdom; instead of Venus, Beauty; instead of Apollo, Truth. Thus, for the 
philosophical Greek, it was transparently clear that we would want to say that 
the gods approved of an act because it was right. To say the reverse would court 
disaster. 
We should also recall that Plato himself, when pressed to define justice in the 
Republic, attempted to explain the relationship of the Forms of the Virtues-Jus-
tice, Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance-in terms of the overarching Form of 
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the Good. In doing so, he was finally driven to the language of myth and metaphor. 
It was the Sun, then, that I meant when I spoke of that offspring which 
the Good has created in the visible world, to stand there in the same 
relation to vision and visible things as that which the Good itself bears 
in the intelligible world to intelligence and to intelligible objects. 23 
Believers have long found in Plato's language a foreshadowing of Johannine 
themes that "God is light; in Him there is no darkness" and that God is "the true 
light that enlightens every man. "24 
Fortunately, the simple believer's DCM is rooted not in Hellenism but in 
Hebraic faith and trust in a sovereign God. The Hebrew people, scholars tell 
us, radically reworked the concepts which they borrowed from their neighbors. 
This enrichment is especially evident with regard to "holy" and "holiness." 
Where their neighbors emphasized the holiness of things, the Israelites wor-
shipped the holiness of God. In so doing they introduced into the concept of 
holiness a basis in personhood. 
Indeed, in Hebraic thought holiness takes on an intensely personal cast. God 
the Holy One is the Righteous and Just One, the God of Love. Since God is the 
perfect moral being, moral qualities pervade His holiness. The power of the 
Holy One also attached to His laws. Thus, the simple believer has no fear of 
affirming that the holiness of an act consists in God's commanding it. Let the 
Greeks submit their deities to the standards of morality. The Israelites, for their 
part, knew that God is Righteousness and hence His commands are righteous. 
His laws, too, show the deepest reality in that they are rooted in His very nature. 
Thus while the Euthyphro dilemma might count decisively against various 
conceptions of gods, it does not defeat formulations of DCM that directly refer 
to the Living God of Scripture. Beyond this-though it marks a speculative 
tum-an explicitly trinitarian reflection on the distinctively personal ground of 
DCM offers us heuristic possibilities that we should not overlook. 
Notice that in our formulating the simple believer's DCM, we underscored 
that God is one. To say that God is one is to say that He is one in being and 
substance. Yet God is also three persons. His nature is triune. Each person is 
wholly God, but each also has a distinguishing characteristic dimension. The 
simple believer's DCM, accordingly, ought to be able to draw fully on this 
special nature of the Living God. God functions as the metaphysical foundation 
of morality, not merely as a detached first cause, but rather as the God and 
Father of believers. Furthermore, if we are to be measured by, or model our 
conduct on, God Himself, then God must reveal Himself to us. But is not this 
revelation none other than the second person of the trinity? For it is Jesus, the 
Son, who is the revelation of God's nature. Jesus, furthermore, exemplifies the 
central virtue of the constellation of virtues to which DCM naturally gives rise: 
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"My aim is not my own will, but the will of him who sent me."25 And finally, 
it is only through the Holy Spirit that we come to know intimately God's will. 
An abiding tmth in God's will, a trust that makes DCM the natural expression 
of the simple believer's moral stance, can come only through the gift of God's 
indwelling spirit. 
Euthyphro, to be sure, could not draw on such an understanding. Thus, in an 
important sense, what Euthyphro couldn't say is far more important, in con-
stmctmg a DCM, than what he could say. He couldn't say, after all, that God 
is one and triune, that God personifies goodness, that God's will is an unchanging 
expression of His reason, and that in obeying God's will human beings are 
divinized. And these are just the sorts of things that one must say if DCM is to 
succeed. But, of course, that has been-in effect--our central thesis throughout. 26 
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